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The general conditions are discussed which quantum state purification protocols have
to fulfill in order to be capable of purifying Bell-diagonal qubit-pair states, provided they
consist of steps that map Bell-diagonal states to Bell-diagonal states and they finally apply a
suitably chosen Calderbank-Shor-Steane code to the outcome of such steps. As a main result
a necessary and a sufficient condition on asymptotic correctability are presented, which relate
this problem to the magnitude of a characteristic exponent governing the relation between
bit and phase errors under the purification steps. These conditions allow a straightforward
determination of maximum tolerable bit error rates of quantum key distribution protocols
whose security analysis can be reduced to the purification of Bell-diagonal states.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The quantum cryptographic protocol developed by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) [1] demon-
strates in an impressive way how the key distribution problem of classical cryptography can be
solved by means of quantum physics. Later Shor and Preskill [2] demonstrated that the security
of this quantum key distribution protocol is guaranteed at least up to bit error rates of approx-
imately 11.4%. Their proof is based on two main ideas. Firstly, it exploits an equivalence be-
tween the originally proposed BB84 protocol as a prepare-and-measure protocol and an associated
entanglement-based protocol. Secondly, it reduces the security issue to the capability of purifying
Bell-diagonal qubit-pair states with the help of one-way classical communication and Calderbank-
Shor-Steane (CSS) codes [3, 4]. Gottesman and Lo [5] extended Shor and Preskill’s approach to
entanglement purification protocols which involve bit- and phase-error correcting sequences based
on classical two-way communication followed by a CSS-based entanglement purification step. This
way they were able to raise the maximum tolerable bit error rate of the BB84 protocol to 18.9%.
Later on Chau [6] extended this approach thereby achieving a maximum tolerable bit error rate of
220%. Motivated by these investigations of Gottesman and Lo in this work general entanglement
purification protocols are analyzed which imply the security of any quantum key distribution pro-
tocol whose security analysis can be reduced to the purification of Bell-diagonal states. The BB84
protocol and the highly symmetric six-state protocol [7] are well-known examples of such quantum
key distribution protocols. The general entanglement purification protocols considered are sup-
posed to map Bell-diagonal states to Bell-diagonal states until the Shannon bound guarantees a
successful completion of the entanglement purification on the basis of an appropriate CSS encoding
and classical one-way communication. A special example thereof is the entanglement purification
protocol introduced by Gottesman and Lo, which, in addition, is compatible with a reduction of
an entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol to an associated prepare-and-measure
scheme. As a main result a necessary and a sufficient condition (main theorem) on asymptotic
correctability of Bell-diagonal qubit-pair states are presented relating the success of such a general
entanglement purification protocol to the magnitude of a characteristic exponent, which governs
the scaling between bit and phase errors. This latter characteristic exponent can be determined
in a straightforward way and allows the determination of maximum tolerable bit error rates of the
Bell-diagonal states involved. Applying this general result to entanglement purification protocols
of the Gottesman-Lo type, for example, this criterion implies that even without any phase-error
correcting steps of the Gottesman-Lo type secret keys can be generated by the BB84 and six-
state quantum cryptographic protocols up to the already known bit error rates of 1/5 = 20% and
1/2−1/(2√5) ≈ 27.6393% [6] and that in the absence of phase-error correction no higher bit error
rates are tolerable. Furthermore, numerical evidence is provided that also arbitrary additional
sequences of phase-error correcting steps cannot improve on these particular bounds.
This manuscript is organized as follows: In order to put the general entanglement purification
protocols considered in our main theorem into perspective we first of all summarize basic aspects
of the entanglement purification protocol of Gottesman and Lo [5] and generalize their original
proposal to arbitrary numbers n of qubit pairs. Correspondingly, basic notions together with the
generalized bit-error (Bn) and phase-error (Pn) correcting Gottesman-Lo-type steps are introduced
in section 2. In section 3 basic asymptotic properties of these purification steps are analyzed for
large numbers of qubit pairs. In particular, the exponents characterizing the scaling of the bit
and phase errors under Bn and Pn steps are determined. Our main theorem concerning the
asymptotic correctability of entanglement purification of Bell-diagonal states and its relation to
the exponents characterizing bit and phase errors is stated and proved in section 4. Finally, based on
this main theorem in section 5 the asymptotic correctability of the Bn and Pn steps characterizing
3Gottesman-Lo-type purification protocols are investigated in more detail. It is shown that bit-error
correcting Bn steps alone are already able to guarantee security of the BB84 protocol and the six-
state protocol up to maximum bit error rates of magnitude 1/5 and 1/2 − 1/(2√5), respectively.
Furthermore, numerical evidence is provided that even arbitrary sequences of phase-error correcting
Pn steps cannot improve on these bounds. Based on this evidence these numbers constitute the
maximum possible error rates which are tolerable in the BB84 protocol and in the six-state protocol
provided error correction and privacy amplification are based on arbitrary sequences of Bn and
Pn steps of the Gottesman-Lo type. For the sake of a clearer presentation of the main ideas some
proofs of theorems stated in these sections are postponed to the appendices. A more detailed
elaboration of some statements can be found in [8].
II. PURIFICATION PROTOCOLS OF THE GOTTESMAN-LO TYPE
In this section basic properties of bit-error (Bn) and phase-error (Pn) correction steps are
discussed which generalize the bit- and phase-error correcting steps BGL and PGL proposed by
Gottesman and Lo [5] to arbitrary numbers n of qubit pairs. These steps are capable of reducing
the bit and phase errors of Bell-diagonal qubit-pair states and can be used as building blocks of
entanglement purification protocols which are based on classical two-way communication. In view
of the Gottesman-Lo theorem [5] entanglement purification protocols consisting of these Bn and
Pn steps can be reduced to prepare-and-measure schemes.
Gottesman and Lo proved that it is sufficient for guaranteeing security of the BB84 and the
six-state protocol to be able to purify classical mixtures of the four (pure) Bell states
|Φ±〉 := (1/√2)[|00〉 ± |11〉], |Ψ±〉 := (1/√2)[|01〉 ± |10〉]. (1)
If necessary, the following notation will be used [9]: (0, 0) := |Φ+〉, (1, 0) := |Φ−〉, (0, 1) := |Ψ+〉,
(1, 1) := |Ψ−〉. Here, the numbers are to be understood as elements of the binary field F2. Mixtures
of Bell states are denoted by
(a, b, c, d) := a |Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ b |Φ−〉〈Φ−|+ c |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|+ d |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| (2)
with a, b, c, d ≥ 0 and a+ b+ c+ d = 1. The set of all such Bell-diagonal states is denoted by Sbd.
A Bell-diagonal state is entangled, if and only if one of the four coefficients is larger than 1/2 [9].
In our discussion a Bell-diagonal state will be called entangled with respect to |Φ+〉, if a > 1/2.
The set of states with a > 1/2 and with a ≥ 1/2 are denoted by Sv and by Sv, respectively.
4In the subsequent discussion we choose the state |Φ+〉 as the reference state for entanglement
purification; therefore a ≡ F will be called fidelity (with respect to |Φ+〉). Furthermore, the
parameters b, c, and d are the pure phase error rate, the pure bit error rate and the combined
bit-phase error rate. Correspondingly, the parameters B = c + d and P = b + d are the total bit
and phase error rates.
For the purposes of entanglement purification it is sufficient to assume that Alice and Bob share
an infinite number of qubit pairs, all described by the same density operator ρ = (a, b, c, d) ∈ Sv
[5, 10, 11]. All purification steps considered act as mappings on the set Sbd. A particular step of
the purification protocols considered takes a fixed number n of qubit pairs, all prepared in the same
state ρ = (a, b, c, d), as input and yields with some non-vanishing probability, which may depend
upon ρ, a final qubit pair in the state ρ′ = (a′, b′, c′, d′) or no qubit pair at all.
A. Bn steps
A Bn step which involves n ∈ N qubit pairs reduces the bit error rate, but simultaneously it
also increases the phase error rate of the original quantum state. It is defined by the following
sequence of steps:
1. Alice and Bob choose n qubit pairs QP1, . . . , QPn.
2. Alice and Bob apply bilateral BXOR operations of the form BXOR(QP1, QPk) for all qubit
pairs k ∈ {2, . . . , n} (n− 1 operations).
3. Alice and Bob measure the bit parities of all pairs from QP2 to QPn and continue using
QP1, if and only if all parities are +1 (same bit values for Alices and Bobs measurement).
The pairs QP2, . . . , QPn are discarded.
Here, the BXOR operation on Bell-diagonal states is defined by [5, 9]
BXOR(QP1, QP2) : (l1,m1)⊗ (l2,m2) 7→ (l1 ⊕ l2,m1)⊗ (l2,m1 ⊕m2). (3)
Thus, for a given set of n pure Bell pairs (li,mi), according to step (ii) the BXOR operations are
equivalent to the transformation⊗n
i=1
(li,mi) 7→
(⊕n
i=1
li,m1
)
⊗
[⊗n
k=2
(lk,m1 ⊕mk)
]
. (4)
According to step (iii) the pair QP1 is kept for the next step, if m1 ⊕mk = 0 holds for all k ∈
{2, . . . , n}. Otherwise this qubit pair is discarded. Therefore, we obtain the relations B1 = idSbd,
B2 = BGL, BnBm = Bnm, and (BGL)
n = B2n .
5Note that Alice and Bob could perform the measurements of the pairs QP2, . . . , QPn imme-
diately after the respective BXOR operation. If the pair QP1 is discarded immediately after the
first false parity, the average number of discarded qubits reduces, which results in a higher key
generation rate.
In A1 it is shown that with respect to the first qubit pair QP1 a Bn step can be identified with
a mapping Bn : Sbd → Sbd with Bn : (a, b, c, d) 7→ (a′, b′, c′, d′) and with
a′ =
[
(a+ b)n + (a− b)n]/2N, b′ = [(a+ b)n − (a− b)n]/2N,
c′ =
[
(c+ d)n + (c− d)n]/2N, d′ = [(c+ d)n − (c− d)n]/2N. (5)
The value N =
[
(a+ b)n + (c+ d)n
]
is the survival probability of the first pair.
B. Pn steps
In analogy to the BGL step also the Bn step can be adapted to correct phase errors [5]. However,
according to the Gottesman-Lo theorem such a step has the disadvantage that it cannot be reduced
to some prepare-and-measure protocol. Therefore, Gottesman and Lo originally developed an
alternative phase-error correction step which is not as efficient, but which can be reduced to a
prepare-and-measure protocol. The Pn step considered in the following is a generalization of this
step originally developed by Gottesman and Lo [5]. For any n ∈ N0, we define a P2n+1 step as
follows:
1. Alice and Bob choose 2n+ 1 qubit pairs QP1, . . . , QP2n+1.
2. Alice and Bob perform Hadamard transformations [5, 12] on all pairs.
3. Alice and Bob perform BXOR operations of the form BXOR(QP1, QPk) for all qubit pairs
with k ∈ {2, . . . , 2n + 1} (2n operations).
4. Alice and Bob measure the bit parities of all pairs from QP2 to QPn; the number of pairs
with bit parity −1 (different outcomes for Alice and Bob) is denoted as m ∈ {0, . . . , 2n}.
5. Alice and Bob perform a Hadamard transformation on QP1.
6. If m ≥ n + 1, Bob performs the transformation 1I ⊗ σz on the first pair. Otherwise, Bob
leaves the first pair unchanged. The pairs QP2, . . . , QP2n+1 are discarded.
6If in step (v) Alice and Bob apply the Hadamard transformation to all qubit pairs, they can
exchange steps (iv) and (v), if they measure the phase parity l1 ⊕ lk instead of the bit parity for
k ∈ {2, . . . , 2n+ 1}. In this latter case the transformation yields
⊗2n+1
i=1
(li,mi) 7→
(
l1,
⊕2n+1
i=1
mi
)
⊗
[⊗2n+1
k=2
(l1 ⊕ lk,mk)
]
. (6)
According to Bob’s final transformation in step (vi) the new phase of the first qubit pair QP1, as
characterized by the parameter l1, is fixed by the majority of the 2n + 1 phases of all qubit pairs
involved.
Similar to the case of the Bn step, we obtain P1 = idSbd and P3 = PGL. But contrary to the
case of Bn steps, a sequence PnPm is always worse than a single Pnm step. This originates from
the fact that the bit errors introduced by PnPm and Pnm sequences are always equal, whereas the
majority of majorities is not necessarily the total majority of phases. Note that the use of a Pn
step is equivalent to the application of the [n, 1, n] code in [6].
Calculating the evolution resulting from the application of a Pn step is much more complicated
than the resulting evolution of Bn steps as given in (5). However, it turns out that the evolution
of bit and phase errors B and P can be determined easily (compare with (15)).
C. Remarks
Note that the bit error rates after applying Bn or Pn steps depend only on the previous bit
error rate (but not on the phase error rate); similarly, the new phase error rate after using a
Pn step depends only on the previous phase error rate. Using Bn steps, the exact coefficients
determine the evolution of the phase error rate; considering ρ ∈ Sv and n→∞, the evolution is
mostly determined by the fidelity a and the pure phase error rate b.
In particular, when using Bn and Pn steps only, Alice and Bob do not gain any advantage, if
they measure bit errors after performing some of these steps. This seems to be obvious considering
the fact that they can be reduced to prepare-and-measure-schemes, where phase errors cannot have
any influence on the protocol.
III. ASYMPTOTIC EVOLUTION OF Bn AND Pn STEPS
In this section the evolution of Bell-diagonal qubit-pair states is investigated, if they are sub-
jected to Bn and Pn steps. Here, the asymptotic evolution for large values of n is of particular
interest. In the subsequent discussion this asymptotic evolution is characterized by exponents r
7and rP for Bn and Pn steps, respectively, which determine the relative scaling between bit and
phase errors. As demonstrated in detail in section IV the values of these characteristic exponents
are directly related to the correctability of Bell-diagonal quantum states.
A. Asymptotic evolution of Bn steps
Let us consider the evolution of the quantum state ρ = (a, b, c, d) ∈ Sv of a single qubit pair
using Bn steps for large values of n. For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that b > 0 and
c+d > 0, because the remaining cases are trivial. For this purpose we define first of all some useful
variables:
x˜ :=
a+ b
c+ d
, ∆1 :=
a− b
c+ d
, ∆2 :=
c− d
c+ d
. (7)
After having performed a Bn step the resulting quantum state is given by
(a′, b′, c′, d′) ≡
(
1
2
− xn + yn + δn, 1
2
− yn − δn, xn − δn, δn
)
:= Bn
[
(a, b, c, d)
]
, (8)
where xn and yn denote the resulting bit error rate (B) and inverse phase error rate (1/2−P ). The
quantity δn characterizes a correlation between bit and phase errors. The evolution (5) immediately
implies (the symbol
.
= means asymptotically equal)
xn = (1 + x˜
n)−1
.
= x˜−n,
2yn = (∆
n
1 +∆
n
2 )/(1 + x˜
n)
.
= ∆n1/x˜
n.
(9)
For particular values of the parameters a, b, c, d it is possible to define a characteristic exponent
r ∈ R with the defining property limn→∞ xn/(2yn)r = 1. In view of the elementary relation
x
1/r
n
2yn
=
(1 + x˜n)1−1/r
∆n1 +∆
n
2
.
=
x˜n(1−1/r)
∆n1
=
(
x˜1−1/r
∆1
)n
, (10)
this defining property implies that the term in the bracket must be unity, i. e.
x˜(1−1/r) = ∆1 ⇔ r =
[
1− ln∆1
ln x˜
]−1
=
ln a+bc+d
ln a+ba−b
. (11)
Therefore, using the conservation of probability, i. e. c+ d = 1− a− b, one may establish relations
between values of the characteristic parameter r and particular Bell-diagonal states. Two examples
of such correlations are:
r > 1 ⇔ a > 1/2 (entanglementw.r.t. |Φ+〉),
r > 2 ⇔ f(a, b) := a2 + b2 − (a+ b)/2 > 0
⇔ (a− 1/4)2 + (b− 1/4)2 > (1/2√2)2 = 1/8.
(12)
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FIG. 1: Regions for r > 2 (white) and r ≤ 2 (black) for fidelity a and pure phase error rate b; grey: no
physical states.
The left hand side of the latter inequality can be interpreted geometrically as a cylinder centered
around the chaotic state ρ = 141I (compare with figure 1). The function f is easier to evaluate than
the exponent r and will be used in some calculations. In the main theorem of the next chapter it
will be demonstrated that purification succeeds in the regime of characteristic exponents r > 2.
B. Asymptotic evolution of Pn steps
The evaluation of the asymptotic evolution of Pn steps turns out to be much more complicated
than the one of Bn steps. For this purpose the following lemma is useful:
Lemma 1 (Properties of the binomial distribution)
Let p ∈ [1/2; 1], n ∈ N be odd; in these cases the relation
fn(p) :=
(n−1)/2∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k = c(n, p) zn (13)
is valid with z := 2
√
p(1− p), where the image of the function c(n, p) is given by the interval [0; 1]
and c(n, p) decreases at most sub-exponentially for n→∞ and for any p ∈ [1/2; 1].
Proof: A proof of this lemma is given in B 1.
Analogous to (8) the asymptotic evolution of the state (a, b, c, d) of a qubit pair under a Pn
step is given by
(a′, b′, c′, d′) =
(
1
2
− un + vn + εn, un − εn, 1
2
− vn − εn, εn
)
:= Pn
[
(a, b, c, d)
]
. (14)
9Here, un is the phase error rate and vn is the inverse bit error rate; the value εn specifies the
correlation between bit and phase errors.
Using these definitions, the calculation of un and vn is straightforward, whereas the calculation
of the correlation εn is rather involved. For odd values of n ∈ N one obtains the relations
un =
∑(n−1)/2
k=0
(n
k
)
(a+ c)k(b+ d)n−k
Lemma1≤ [4(a+ c)(b + d)]n/2,
2vn = (a+ b− c− d)n ≡ Fn.
(15)
Using lemma 1 we may also write un = c(n, a + c) z
n for z = 2
√
(a+ c)(b+ d). Similar to the
construction for Bn steps, one can define an exponent rP , which characterizes the asymptotic
evolution of Pn in the sense that z/F
rP = 1. This yields the relation
rP =
ln z
lnF
=
ln 2
√
(a+ c)(b+ d)
ln(a+ b− c− d) =
1
2
ln 4(a+ c)(b + d)
ln(a+ b− c− d) (16)
for the characteristic exponent rP . In view of the relation
un
(2vn)rP
=
c(n, a+ c) zn
F rPn
= c(n, a+ c)
( z
F rP
)n
. (17)
the quotient un/(2vn)
rP converges to +∞ for all exponents larger than rP because c(n, a+ c) ≤ 1
decreases at most sub-exponentially. Furthermore, the bounds z, F ≤ 1 imply the inequalities (B
and P denote bit and phase error rate):
rP > 1 ⇔ (1/2−B)2 + (1/2− P )2 > (1/2)2 = 1/4,
rP > 2 ⇔ (1− 2B)4 − 4P (1− P ) > 0.
(18)
C. Remarks
Note that the Pn step defines a mapping Pn : (B,P ) 7→ (B′, P ′), if one ignores the correlation
between bit and phase errors. In particular, a possible statistical independence of bit and phase
errors, i. e. the validity of the relation (b+ d)(c + d) − d = 0, is invariant under Pn steps but not
under Bn steps. The following lemma is of some interest:
Lemma 2 (Separability using Pn steps)
Let ρ = (a, b, c, d) ∈ Sv, n ∈ N be odd and ρ′ = (a′, b′, c′, d′) := Pn(ρ); this implies
1. ρ′ is entangled, if and only if a′ > 1/2 holds.
2. If bit and phase error rate in ρ are statistically independent, then for sufficiently large n the
state ρ′ is separable, if and only if rP (ρ) < 1 holds.
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Proof: For the proof of the first statement, it is sufficient to show that b′, c′, d′ ≤ 1/2. From (15)
follows the inequality B′ = c′ + d′ = (1 − Fn)/2 < 1/2 and because of F > 0 one gets c′, d′ ≤ 1/2.
P ′ = b′ + d′ decreases monotonically in n, which implies the assertion.
Thus, for the proof of the second inequality one concentrates on the value of a′. Statis-
tical independence of bit and phase errors implies a′ = 1 − P ′ − B′ + B′P ′; using the no-
tation c(n) := c(n, a + c) yields a′ = 1 − c(n)zn − (1/2 − Fn/2) + c(n)zn (1/2 − Fn/2) and
a′ ≤ 1/2 ⇔ (1 − c(n)zn)Fn ≤ c(n)zn. Therefore, for a resulting separable state for n→∞,
Fn ≤ c(n)zn is sufficient. Because c(n) decreases at most sub-exponentially, F < z, i. e. rP < 1 is
sufficient. On the contrary, if rP ≥ 1, i. e. F ≥ z, the assertion follows by a similar reasoning.
IV. THE CRITERION FOR ASYMPTOTIC CORRECTABILITY (MAIN THEOREM)
In this section the question of asymptotic correctability of Bell-diagonal quantum states is
addressed from a more general point of view. In particular, our main theorem is stated and proved
which relates the asymptotic correctability of a large class of general entanglement purification
protocols to the characteristic exponents determining the scaling of their resulting bit and phase
errors. The general entanglement purification protocols of this class are supposed to consist of
arbitrary sequences of basic steps which involve classical one- and/or two communication between
Alice and Bob until the Shannon bound is reached. Subsequently these steps are supposed to be
completed by a CSS-based purification protocol, which involves classical one-way communication.
This main theorem will be specialized to sequences of Bn and Pn steps in the next section.
Let us start by defining the notion of asymptotic correctability :
Definition 1 (Asymptotic correctability)
Let ρ = (a, b, c, d) ∈ Sv and (Sn)n∈N be a sequence of possible steps in an entanglement purification
protocol. The state ρ is called asymptotically Sn-correctable under this sequence, if there exists an
N0 ∈ N, such that for all n ∈ N, n ≥ N0 the inequality AsymCSS
[
Sn(ρ)
]
:= 1−H(B)−H(P ) > 0
holds, where B and P denote bit and phase error rate of the resulting state Sn(ρ) after the use of
that step.
Here, H(ξ) := −ξ log2 ξ − (1 − ξ) log2 (1 − ξ) is the binary Shannon entropy and the function
AsymCSS denotes the Shannon bound, i. e. the minimum rate of an asymmetric CSS code [3,
4]. If AsymCSS(ρ) is positive the state ρ can be corrected by some CSS code, i. e. by one-way
classical communication. Important special cases are (Sn)n∈N ∈ {(Bn)n∈N, (P2n+1)n∈N0}. Note
that asymptotic correctability implies correctability, but not vice versa, in general.
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Using the notation of (8) for the state of a qubit pair after application of an arbitrary Sn step,
i. e. B → xn and P → 1/2 − yn, one obtains
AsymCSS(xn, 1/2 − yn) = −H(xn) + (ln 2)−1
[
2yn artanh(2yn) +
1
2
ln(1− 4y2n)
]
. (19)
Because of the symmetry of AsymCSS, this is also valid for the case, where P → xn and B →
1/2 − yn. Dropping positive terms in the (partial) Taylor series expansion of (19) one obtains the
lower bound
AsymCSS(xn, 1/2 − yn) ≥ A(xn, yn) := (ln 2)−1
[
xn lnxn − xn + 2y2n
]
(20)
for 0 ≤ xn ≤ 1/2 and 0 ≤ yn ≤ 1/2.
Obviously, one can define an asymptotic Sn-correction purification protocol in the following
way: Alice and Bob determine the smallest n ∈ N, such that Sn(ρ) can be corrected by some
asymmetric CSS code, apply Sn, and use an appropriate CSS code to obtain a purified final state.
In the case of Bn and Pn steps smaller values of n usually result in higher key generation rates,
both in the two-way part of the protocol and in the CSS part.
Finally, it should be noted that the condition AsymCSS(ρ) > 0 is only sufficient, but not
necessary for the existence of asymmetric CSS codes which are capable of purifying a quantum
state. If this condition is violated, there may also exist applicable CSS codes, but this cannot be
guaranteed in general.
After these introductory remarks let us state and prove now the following main theorem:
Theorem 1 (Main theorem)
Let ρ = (a, b, c, d) ∈ Sv and (Sn)n∈N be a sequence of possible steps in an entanglement purification
protocol. Furthermore, let
(xn, yn) = (B, 1/2 − P ) or (xn, yn) = (P, 1/2 −B)
after application of an Sn step, and let (Sn)n∈N be a sequence of such steps, such that
limn→∞ xn = 0 holds. Finally, let
rsup := sup {r ∈ R| sup {xn/yrn|n ∈ N} <∞} . (21)
Then, ρ is asymptotically Sn-correctable, if rsup > 2 holds. Furthermore, if ρ is asymptotically
Sn-correctable, then rsup ≥ 2.
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Proof: First part (rsup > 2 is sufficient): If rsup > 2, one can find an exponent r > 2 and
a value c > 0, such that xn ≤ cyrn for all n ∈ N. The function A(x, y) is used to minorize
AsymCSS(x, 1/2 − y). As a consequence the worst case with the maximum possible error rates is
given by xn = cy
r
n. This implies
(ln 2 ·A)(xn, yn) = cyrn ln(cyrn)− cyrn + 2y2n > 0
⇔ c2yr−2n [(ln c+ 1) + r ln yn] + 1 > 0.
(22)
Because xn tends to zero in the limit n→∞, also yn does so. Therefore, the first term of the latter
inequality becomes arbitrarily small due to limn→∞ y
r−2
n ln yn = 0. Thus, we obtain the required
result, namely that AsymCSS(xn, 1/2 − yn) > 0 for large n.
Second part (rsup ≥ 2 is necessary): The condition rsup < 2 implies that sup
{
xn/y
2
n|n ∈ N
}
=
∞, i. e. there exists at least a subsequence, for which c := inf {xn/y2n|n ∈ N} > 0 holds. From the
Shannon bound it is obvious, that for guaranteeing correctability, xn should be as small and yn as
large as possible. Therefore, in view of the conditions of the theorem the best case is given by a
subsequence with xn = cy
2
n. Using relation (19) and the elementary properties
(d/dy) [2y artanh(2y) + ln(1− 4y2)/2] = 2 artanh(2y),
(d/dy)
[
2 artanh(2y)
]
= 4/(4 − y2),
(d/dy)
[− ln 2H(cy2)] = 2cy ln (cy2/(1 − cy2)) ,
(d2/dy2)
[− ln 2H(cy2)] = 2c [ln (cy2/(1− cy2))− 2/(cy2 − 1)] , (23)
one therefore notices
lim
n→∞
AsymCSS(cy2n, 1/2 − yn) = 0,
lim
n→∞
d
dy
AsymCSS(cy2, 1/2 − y) |y=yn = 0,
d2
dy2
AsymCSS(cy2, 1/2 − y) |y=yn < 0 for yn → 0. (24)
Thus, the state is not asymptotically Sn-correctable and the assertion is proved.
In particular, the special case (Sn)n∈N ∈ {(Bn)n∈N, (P2n+1)n∈N0} yields
Corollary 1 (Asymptotic Bn- and Pn-correctability)
For ρ ∈ Sv the following statements are true:
ρ is asymptoticallyBn correctable ⇔ r(ρ) = ln
a+b
c+d
ln a+b
a−b
> 2,
ρ is asymptotically Pn correctable ⇒ rP (ρ) = ln 4(a+c)(b+d)2 ln(a+b−c−d) > 2.
(25)
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Proof: This assertion follows immediately from theorem 1 and the basic properties of Bn and
Pn steps discussed in sections IIIA and IIIB. The equivalence in the case of asymptotic Bn-
correctability results from the fact that for r = 2 the equation limn→∞ xn/y
2
n = 4 holds (see
section IIIA); this implies inf
{
xn/y
2
n|n ∈ N
}
> 0 and the assertion follows as in the proof of
theorem 1.
V. ASYMPTOTIC CORRECTABILITY USING Bn AND Pn STEPS
In this section it is analyzed for which qubit-pair states (a, b, c, d) a purification based on Bn
and Pn steps and asymmetric CSS codes fulfilling the Shannon bound is possible according to the
main theorem of the previous section. It is shown that bit-error correcting Bn steps alone are
already able to guarantee security of the BB84 protocol and the six-state protocol up to maximum
bit error rates of magnitudes 1/5 and 1/2−1/(2√5), respectively. Furthermore, numerical evidence
is provided that even arbitrary sequences of phase-error correcting Pn steps cannot improve on
these bounds. Based on this evidence the maximum possible bit error rates which are tolerable
in the BB84 protocol and in the six-state protocol are given by 1/5 and 1/2 − 1/(2√5), provided
error correction and privacy amplification are based on arbitrary sequences of Bn and Pn steps
and the use of CSS codes.
A. Reduction to the use of the exponent r
So far we have concentrated on three possibilities for purifying a given Bell-diagonal quan-
tum state. A quantum cryptographic protocol can be made secure, if it produces states with
AsymCSS(ρ) > 0, r(ρ) ≡ ln
a+b
c+d
ln a+b
a−b
> 2 or rP (ρ) ≡ ln 4(a+c)(b+d)2 ln(a+b−c−d) > 2 and possibly in the case
rP (ρ) = 2. As can be seen from the following theorem these conditions are not independent:
Theorem 2 (Reduction to the characteristic exponent r)
Let ρ = (a, b, c, d) ∈ Sv. Then,
AsymCSS(ρ) > 0⇒ rP (ρ) > 1⇒ r(ρ) > 2. (26)
In particular, rP (ρ) ≥ 2⇒ r(ρ) > 2.
Proof: A detailed proof is given in B2.
It should be noted that for any state ρ ∈ Sbd, the value of r(ρ) is invariant with respect to Bn
steps, because from (5) one obtains immediately the relation r
[
Bn(ρ)
]
= r(ρ).
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B. Limits for the maximum tolerable error rate
Theorem 2 shows that it is sufficient to consider the characteristic exponent r for determining
the correctability using Bn and Pn steps and asymmetric CSS codes (using the Shannon bound).
According to this theorem the only possibility to purify states with r ≤ 2 is to apply Pn steps,
which may possibly yield states with r > 2. If this is not possible, the asymptotic Bn-correction
is already optimal with respect to the maximum tolerable error rate in our model. The following
conjecture indeed suggests that asymptotic Bn correction is optimal:
Conjecture 1 (Optimality of the asymptotic Bn correction)
Let ρ = (a, b, c, d) ∈ Sv with r(ρ) ≤ 2. Then, for all odd n ∈ N
r
[
Pn(ρ)
] ≤ 2. (27)
The subsequent lemmata show that for a proof of this conjecture it is sufficient to prove it on a
certain subset of states (compare with figure 1). But this turns out to be difficult and an analytical
proof is not known. However, as demonstrated below numerical results (compare with figure 2)
and plausibility arguments are in favour of the validity of this conjecture.
For the formulation of these lemmata it is convenient to parameterize the set Sv by
Z(a, b; z) :=
(
a, b, z(1 − a− b), (1 − z)(1− a− b)) ∈ Sv (28)
with a ≥ 1/2, b ≥ 0, a+ b ≤ 1 and z ∈ [0; 1]. It is useful to visualize these lemmata with the help
of figure 1. The function f introduced in (12) will be used frequently.
Lemma 3 (Concerning the diagonals in figure 1)
Let a, b, z, z′, δ ∈ [0; 1] be chosen in such a way that Z(a, b; z), Z(a − δ, b + δ; z′) ∈ Sv. Then,
r [Z(a, b; z)] ≤ 2⇒ r [Z(a− δ, b+ δ; z′)] ≤ 2.
Proof: By (12), r ≤ 2 ⇔ f(a, b) ≤ 0; thus, z and z′ are unnecessary and one can calculate
f(a − δ, b + δ) = f(a, b) + 2δ(−a + b + δ). The first expression is negative by assumption, the
factor 2δ is non-negative. Using Z(a − δ, b + δ; z′) ∈ Sv, one finds a − δ ≥ 1/2 and therefore
δ ≤ a− 1/2 ≤ a− b, which implies the assertion.
Lemma 4 (First reduction to states with d = 0)
Let a, b ∈ [0; 1] be chosen in such a way that Z(a, b; 1) ∈ Sv and f(a, b) ≤ 0, and let n ∈ N be odd
and z ∈ [0; 1]. Then, r[Pn(Z(a, b; 1))] ≤ 2⇒ r[Pn(Z(a, b; z))] ≤ 2.
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FIG. 2: The function r
[
Pn
(
K(t)
)]
for n ∈ {3, 5, 7} (left) and n ∈ {11, 21} (right).
Proof: Let ρ = Z(a, b; z) ∈ Sv. The Pn step can be viewed as a mapping from old to new bit
and phase error rates, i. e. Pn : (B,P ) 7→ (B′, P ′). In view of B = c + d and B′ = c′ + d′ the bit
error rates do not depend on z. In figure 1 a variation of z results in a variation on the diagonal
a′ + b′ = const. By the evolution (6) one notes that the fidelity a′ becomes larger, if the initial
phase error rate gets small (proof in B 3 a). Lemma 3 now implies the assertion.
Because of this, it is sufficient to consider the best case, i. e. z = 1 or d = 0.
Lemma 5 (Second reduction of the parameter space)
Let a, b, ε ∈ [0; 1] be chosen in such a way that Z(a, b; 1), Z(a − ε, b + ε; 1) ∈ Sv, and let n ∈ N be
odd. Then, r
[
Pn
(
Z(a, b; 1)
)] ≤ 2⇒ r[Pn(Z(a− ε, b+ ε; 1))] ≤ 2.
Proof: The bit error rate B = c+ d before and thus after a Pn step does not depend on ε. Using
lemma 3, in the best case the fidelity a′ is maximal after performing a Pn step; as shown in the
B 3b this is the case for ε = 0.
Because of the lemmata 4 and 5 the assertion from conjecture 1 has to be shown only on a
certain subset, which can be parameterized by the function K : [−1;+1]→ Sv with
K(t) := Z
(
1/4 + (2
√
2)−1 cos(pit/4), 1/4 + (2
√
2)−1 sin(pit/4); 1
)
. (29)
This subset corresponds to the border of the black circle of figure 1. Figure 2 demonstrates
graphically the validity of the claim for the first few values of n. The curves of figure 2 even seem
to imply that r tends to zero for large values of n. By Lemma 2 it also appears that the states
become separable and thus non-correctable for large values of n.
Provided conjecture 1 is correct the following conjecture can be proven:
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Conjecture 2 (Correctability by using Bn and Pn steps)
For ρ = (a, b, c, d) ∈ Sv the following statements are equivalent:
1. r(ρ) > 2 (or equivalent f(a, b) > 0 by (12));
2. ρ is asymptotically Bn-correctable;
3. There exists a sequence of Bn and Pn steps, such that after performing this sequence the
resulting state ρ′ fulfills the inequality AsymCSS(ρ′) > 0.
Proof: The equivalence of the first two statements was shown in corollary 1 on page 12; that the
second statement implies the third one is trivial, and that the third one implies the first follows
from theorem 2 and conjecture 1 via contraposition.
C. Values of the maximum tolerable error rate
Using the criterion derived in the previous sections, one can calculate the maximum tolerable
error rate for the BB84 and the six-state protocol assuming the model considered there. In case
of the six-state protocol b = c = d holds [5]; thus, one only has to consider the so-called Werner
states. Using the notation
W(F ) :=
(
F, 1−F3 ,
1−F
3 ,
1−F
3
)
, BB84(F ) :=
(
F, 1−F2 ,
1−F
2 , 0
)
, (30)
one calculates for the six-state protocol
r
[
W(F )
]
> 2 ⇔ F > (5 + 3√5)/20 ≈ 0.585410
⇔ B < 1/2 − 1/(2√5) ≈ 27.6393%.
(31)
For the BB84 protocol one can in principle use similar reasoning as the one by Gottesman-Lo [5],
but the statement that the BB84(F ) state is the worst case for fixed bit error rate B can be proved
much easier now. As before B = P = b+ d = c+ d and thus b = c hold; using a suitable parameter
δ ∈ [0;B], one can rewrite the state as
ρ = (1− 2B + δ,B − δ,B − δ, δ). (32)
By (12) it follows that f(ρ) = 2δ2 + (2 − 6B)δ + (1/2 − 7B/2 + 5B2) and derivation with respect
to δ yields 4δ2+(2− 6B) ≥ 0, if B ≤ 33.3%. Therefore, f increases monotonically with respect to
δ and the worst case possible is δ = 0, i. e. the BB84 state defined above. In this case, it follows
r
[
BB84(F )
]
> 2 ⇔ F > 3/5 = 0.600000
⇔ B < 1/5 = 20.0000%.
(33)
These maximum tolerable error rates coincide exactly with the ones given by Chau [6].
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed general entanglement purification protocols which imply the security of any quan-
tum key distribution protocol whose security analysis can be reduced to the purification of Bell-
diagonal states. These entanglement purification protocols are supposed to consist of arbitrary
sequences of basic steps involving classical one- and/or two-way communication between Alice and
Bob until the Shannon bound guarantees a successful completion of the entanglement purification
on the basis of an appropriate CSS encoding and classical one-way communication. As a main
result a necessary and a sufficient condition on asymptotic correctability of Bell-diagonal qubit-
pair states were presented relating the success of such general entanglement purification protocol
to the magnitude of a characteristic exponent, which governs the scaling between bit and phase
errors. Applying this theorem to entanglement purification protocols of the Gottesman-Lo type we
demonstrated that in the cases of the BB84 and six-state quantum cryptographic protocols secret
keys can be generated even without any phase-error correcting steps of the Gottesman-Lo type
up to the already known bit error rates of 1/5 = 20% and 1/2 − 1/(2√5) ≈ 27.6393%. Further-
more, numerical evidence was provided that also the inclusion of additional arbitrary sequences of
phase-error correcting steps cannot improve on these particular bounds.
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APPENDIX A: EVOLUTION USING Bn AND Pn STEPS
1. Evolution using Bn steps
On two possibly different states ρ = (a, b, c, d) ∈ Sbd and σ = (p, q, r, s) ∈ Sbd a B2 step is
applied. After measuring and discarding the second qubit pair, the reduced density matrix of the
first pair reads
ρ′ =
(
ap+ bq
N
,
bp+ aq
N
,
cr + ds
N
,
dr + cs
N
)
, (A1)
where N = (a+ b)(p+ q) + (c+ d)(r + s) is the normalization constant.
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The proof of formulae (5) will be done by induction similar to the one in [6]. In a Bn step
the B2 step is used (n − 1) times, where ρ is the first pair and σ is a new pair every time, i. e.
ρ = Bk [(a, b, c, d)] and σ = (a, b, c, d). One notes, that the case n = 1 is trivial and n = 2 is the
starting point of the induction. One now assumes that formulae (5) are valid for a fixed n ∈ N.
By using (A1) one calculates for (a′, b′, c′, d′) := Bn+1
[
(a, b, c, d)
]
a′ =
[
(a+ b)n+1 + (a− b)n+1]/2N ′ b′ = [(a+ b)n+1 − (a− b)n+1]/2N ′
c′ =
[
(c+ d)n+1 + (c− d)n+1]/2N ′ d′ = [(c+ d)n+1 − (c− d)n+1]/2N ′ (A2)
where N ′ =
[
(a+ b)n+1 + (c+ d)n+1
]
is the new normalization constant.
2. Evolution using Pn steps
The evolution of a state by applying Pn steps is more complicated than the one by applying
Bn steps. An analytical expression can be given by listing all possible combinations of Bell states,
calculating the resulting Bell state systematically (by phase majority and bit parity) and adding
them up according to their probability; for Pn
[
(a, b, c, d)
]
it follows:
∑
(A,B,C,D)∈Xn
M(A,B,C,D)
(
aAbBcCdD, aBbAcDdC , aCbDcAdB , aDbCcBdA
)
. (A3)
Here, M(A,B,C,D) := (A + B + C + D)!/(A!B!C!D!) is a multinomial coefficient and Xn :={
(A,B,C,D) ∈ N40|A+B + C +D = n,A+ C > B +D,A+B odd
}
.
APPENDIX B: REMARKS TO SOME THEOREMS
1. Proof of lemma 1
The idea of lemma 1 (page 8) is to determine the exponential evolution of fn(p) and to absorb
it into the value of zn. Therefore, the appropriate value is z(p) = limn→∞
n
√
fn(p). In particular,
z(1/2) = 1 and z(1) = 0. For the remaining cases p ∈ (1/2; 1), one uses only the last term in the
expression for f2n+1(p), which leads to
f2n+1(p) =
n∑
k=0
(
2n+ 1
k
)
pk (1− p)2n+1−k ≥
(
2n + 1
n
)
pn (1− p)n+1. (B1)
The Stirling formula [13] nne−n
√
2pin ≤ n! ≤ nne−n√2pin e1/12n yields
n+ 1
2n+ 1
·
(
2n+ 1
n
)
=
(2n)!
(n!)2
≥ (2n)
2n e−2n
√
2pi(2n)
n2n e−2n 2pin e1/6n
= 22n
e−1/6n√
pin
. (B2)
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FIG. 3: Left figure: minimum fidelity for r > 2, rP > 1 and rP > 2 (down to up); right figure: Lines for
AsymCSS(B,P ) = 0 and rP = 1
Thus,
(2n+1
n
) ≥ 22n+1h(n) with h(n) = e−1/6n(1− 12(n+1))/√pin and therefore
f2n+1(p)
1
2n+1 ≥ 2h(n) 12n+1 p
1
2+ 1
n (1− p)
1
2− 1
n+1
n→∞−→ 2
√
p(1− p). (B3)
By this z(p) ≥ 2√p(1− p) was proved. The inequality z(p) ≤ 2√p(1− p) is a special case of the
Chernoff bound (cf. [12], p. 154, (3.5)).
2. Proof of theorem 2
a. On the first implication (AsymCSS(ρ) > 0⇒ rP > 1)
For the proof of the first implication, one notes that AsymCSS and rP can be considered as
functions of B and P and that AsymCSS(B1, P1) ≥ AsymCSS(B2, P2) holds, if 0 ≤ B1 ≤ B2 ≤ 1/2
and 0 ≤ P1 ≤ P2 ≤ 1/2. Because of (18) it has to be shown that AsymCSS(B,P ) ≤ 0 is true on
the circular arc defined by rP = 1 (see figure 3), i. e. that
h(t) := 1−H[(cos t)/2] −H[(sin t)/2] ≤ 0 (B4)
is valid for t ∈ [0;pi/2]; by symmetry of the function, it is sufficient to show the property for
t ∈ [0;pi/4]. Using h(0) = 0, it is further sufficient to show that h′(t) ≤ 0 for t ∈ [0;pi/4], i. e.
(ln 4 · h′)(t) = cos t[ln sin t− ln(2− sin t)]− sin t[ln cos t− ln(2− cos t)] ≤ 0. (B5)
Rewriting this inequality yields sin t
[
ln(2−cos t)−ln cos t] ≤ cos t[ln(2−sin t)−ln sin t] and because
t ∈ [0;pi/4] implies cos t ≥ sin t ≥ 0, it further only remains to show that
h′B(t) := ln(2− cos t)− ln cos t− ln(2− sin t) + ln sin t ≤ 0 (B6)
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is valid. By h′′B(t) = (sin t/(2− cos t)) + tan t+ (cos t/(2− sin t)) + cot t, h′′B(t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ [0;pi/4],
and thus, h′B increases monotonically. Finally, h
′
B(pi/4) = 0, which implies the assertion.
b. On the second implication (rP > 1⇒ r > 2)
The proof of the second implication can also be visualized by figure 3. Plotting the minimum
fidelity a ∈ [1/2; 1], for which r > 2 is true, as a function of b ∈ [0; 1/2] results in the function
fr=2(b) := 1/4 +
√
1/8− (b− 1/4)2. (B7)
Because rP depends upon the error rates B and P , it is not directly possible, to plot the minimum
fidelity a as a function of b. Assuming the best case (i. e. the smallest minimum fidelity possible),
one assumes the minimum phase error rate and therefore d = 0. In this case the limiting function
is
frP=1(b) := 1− b− (1/2 −
√
b(1− b)). (B8)
For proving frP=1 ≥ fr=2 (see also figure 3), let ∆(b) := frP=1(b) − fr=2(b). It has to be shown
that ∆(b) ≥ 0 for b ∈ [0; 1/2]. This function is continuous and by the intermediate value theorem,
it is sufficient to show that b1 = 0 and b2 = 1/2 are the only points where it is zero and that there
exists a point b where ∆(b) > 0. Repeated squaring of the equation ∆(b) = 0 yields a necessary
condition for any zero of ∆:
5b4 − 6b3 + 9b2/4− b/4 = 5b(b− 1/5)(b − 1/2)2 = 0. (B9)
The set of zeroes of the last equation is {0, 1/5, 1/2}. Because of ∆(0) = ∆(1/2) = 0 and ∆(1/5) =
1/10 > 0, ∆ is non-negative on the whole interval [0; 1/2].
3. Remarks to conjecture 1
Some details regarding lemmata 4 and 5 are given. Before continuing, note the following lemma
(the proof is trivial):
Lemma 6 (Monotonicity of the binomial distribution)
Let n ∈ N0 and r ∈ {0, . . . , n}. The function f : [0; 1] → [0; 1], which is defined by f(x) :=∑r
k=0
(
n
k
)
xk(1− x)n−k decreases monotonically in x.
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a. On the first reduction
It remains to show, that a′ is maximal, if z = 1. By (A3) it follows using ρ = Z(a, b; z)
and K := C + D and (A,B,C,D) ∈ Xn that a′ =
∑
A,B M(A,B,C + D, 0)a
AbB(1 − a −
b)C+D
∑Dmax
D=0
(K
D
)
zK−D(1− z)D. For a′ being maximal, it is sufficient that for all possible A,B,K
each term of the inner sum becomes maximal. For fixed A and B the sum over D is of such a form,
that lemma 6 can be applied, i. e. a′ becomes maximal when (1− z) = 0 or z = 1 hold.
b. On the second reduction
The proof is similar to the previous one. UsingK := A+B yields a′ =
∑
C
(
n
C
)
cC
∑Bmax
B=0
(
K
B
)
(a−
ε)K−B(b+ ε)B . As before the maximality of the inner sum is sufficient for the maximality of a′. If
one divides this by (a+ b)K , the assertion follows by lemma 6.
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